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New advances in biotechnology have enhanced production of maize, soybeans, and 
cotton. Consumer reactions to the new technology have been mixed. Both the supply 
shock, from an increase in productivity or a reduction in input use, and the demand 
shock, which is determined by the consumer response to consuming GM foods, affect 
production, trade, and prices of GM foods. In this paper, we survey models that analyze 
the market effects of GM technology. The results depend on a number of important issues 
such as the cost of market segmentation and labeling, the nature of the productivity shock 
to producers of GM products, and the extent of any adverse reaction to GM products by 
consumers. The results from global trade models indicate that, if costs of labelling and 
market segmentation are not large, world markets can adjust to the various scenarios 
without generating extreme price differentials between GM and non-GM commodities or 
extreme changes in the pattern of world production and trade. Through market linkages, 
the benefits of the new technology tend to be spread widely, with adopters generally 
gaining more than non-adopters. In particular, developing countries will benefit if they 
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New advances in biotechnology have enhanced production of selected agricultural 
commodities in major exporting countries such as the U.S., Argentina, Australia, and 
Canada.
1 Some developing countries such as China and Mexico have adopted these 
technologies in their domestic markets, but are not major exporters of these products. 
Maize, soybeans, and cotton have been the major beneficiaries to date, with active 
research on other crops.
2 Proponents of these new technologies argue that they can 
increase productivity, reduce pesticide use, and improve the nutritional quality of food. 
Opponents, however, worry about both the safety of consuming genetically modified 
(GM) foods and the impact of biotechnology on the environment.
3  
 
In certain high-income countries, notably Japan and the European Union (EU), 
the government has responded to consumer scepticism over GM products.
4 For example, 
the EU formalized a moratorium on the approval of additional GM crops for consumption 
in June 1999.
5 Labeling also addresses consumer concerns. Most OECD countries have 
instituted or are discussion some type of mandatory labeling. The situation is fluid and 
labeling rules differ across countries.
6 At one extreme, the U.S. and Canada require 
labeling only when the nutritional or allergenic composition has been altered through 
                                                 
1 In general, these countries had devoted a high share of total acreage to biotech products in 2000: U.S. 41 
percent, Argentina 84 percent, Australia 41 percent, and Canada 17.6 percent (Marra et al. 2002). The 
largest shares of genetically engineered crops in 1999 were found in Argentina (approximately 90 percent 
of the soybean crop), Canada (62 percent of the rapeseed crop), and the United States (55 percent of cotton, 
50 percent of soybean and 33 percent of the maize crops) (James 1999). The proportion of GM crops grown 
in developing countries increased from 14 percent in 1997 to 24 percent in 2000 (James 2000). 
2 Marra (2001) lists 15 major transgenic crops that have been approved for planting in a number of 
countries. These include canola, carnations, chicory, corn (maize), cotton, melon, papaya, potato, rice, 
soybeans, squash, sugar beets, tobacco, tomatoes, and wheat. 
3 One can make a distinction between ￿genetically modified￿ (GM) organisms (or GMOs), which refer to 
all forms of genetic modification, including standard methods of selective breeding, and ￿transgenic￿ 
organisms, which involve the transfer of genetic material across species. Following common usage, we will 
use the term ￿GM￿ or ￿GMO￿ to refer to transgenic organisms, which are the focus of the controversies. 
Codex has adopted the term  ￿agricultural biotechnology￿ and that is the common usage in term of common 
usage in the U.S.  We will use it interchangeably with ￿GM￿ and ￿GMO￿. 
4 More generally, recent regulatory failures in the EU have raised consumer concerns about food safety 
(e.g. mad cow disease, dioxin contaminated animal feed, and foot and mouth disease). The food crisis, 
however, has not been caused by GM foods. 
5 The EU is developing policies to eventually resume the process of EU approval for GM crops. See 
Sheldon (2002) for more details on EU regulations pertaining to GM foods. 
6 See OECD (2000), table 1, pp. 13-14 for a summary of labeling legislation by country.   
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genetic engineering. Otherwise, labeling food containing GM ingredients is voluntary. At 
the other extreme, the EU has mandatory labeling for all food and food ingredients 
containing genetically engineered DNA/proteins above a one percent tolerance level. 
 
While labeling would allow consumers to make informed choices, it is currently 
difficult and expensive for producers to preserve the identity of either the GM or the non-
GM variety through the entire production chain, from raw to finished product. The issue 
is important and contentious. High costs of segmenting the markets for GM and non-GM 
commodities may well largely offset the potential gains from the new technologies, 
forcing producers and distributors to bear costs that they argue are unnecessary.
7 If 
labeling requirements become the norm, however, one might expect cost-saving 
technologies to emerge that could significantly reduce the costs of segmenting the 
markets.  
 
These issues are especially important for developing countries, where there are 
many poor people who spend a large share of their income on food and derive much of 
that income from agriculture. In the EU and Japan, where incomes are high and 
agriculture is a very small share of economic activity, consumers can afford to be critical 
about the introduction of new agricultural technologies and production processes about 
which they are unsure. For developing countries, however, increasing agricultural 
productivity and lowering food prices is very important, and the costs to society of not 
adopting these new technologies is relatively much higher.
8 
 
The introduction of new GM technologies has raised a number of issues and 
challenges to the world trading system. Much of the debate to date has been highly 
politicized. There is a real need for better information, both about the underlying science 
(what are the potential new areas of application and the potential impacts on the 
environment, biodiversity, and health) and about the economic impacts of the new 
technologies. Important research questions include: 
 
•  What are the actual and potential gains in productivity and food quality, and who 
will benefit from them? 
•  What are the potential impacts on world agricultural production, prices, and 
trade? 
•  What will be the impact of restrictions on the use of GM technologies, including 
production and trade restrictions, changes in consumer preferences, and 
segmentation of GM and non-GM markets (including labeling requirements)? 
•  What are the differential impacts of these trends on developed and developing 
countries? 
•  How are the institutions of the world trading system dealing with, and adapting to, 
these technological changes? 
 
                                                 
7 At present, segmenting and labeling costs have not deterred U.S. farmers from expanding biotech crop 
acreage (Fernandez-Cornejo, Jorge and William D. McBride, 2002). 
8 For a discussion of the perspective of developing countries on biotechnology issues, see Pinstrup-
Andersen and Cohen (2001) and Pardy (2001).   
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This paper surveys analyses of the current and potential economic impact of the 
new technologies, under different scenarios concerning how the world trading system and 
national markets handle GM commodities. We do not review studies of the science and 
potential impacts on the environment, biodiversity, or health. There are two basic 
approaches that have been used in the economics work: (1) partial analysis focusing on 
specific issues, some in a partial-equilibrium framework; and (2) multi-country, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) world trade models. In the next section, we 
briefly discuss the nature of the policy issues raised by the introduction of the new GM 
technologies. We then survey the existing economic studies, focusing on how they 
address the issues raised above.  
 
Given that the new technologies are very new and rapidly evolving, that there are 
major knowledge gaps about their potential impact on production and distribution costs, 
and that the world trading system is just starting to adapt, the economic studies we review 
must all be viewed as tentative, based on uncertain premises and incomplete data. Much 
of the work has had to rely on sensitivity analysis￿identifying important parameters￿
and consideration of potential scenarios, rather than econometric analysis of historical 
data. The studies have produced a few robust conclusions, as well as identifying crucial 
assumptions and important information gaps.  
2. Policy  Debate 
 
The debate over GM products raises a number of issues that affect trade and the 
world trading system.
9 Currently, countries have very different domestic regulations of 
GM products. U.S. regulators view GM foods as not substantially different from the 
conventional variety (e.g. they are ￿substantially equivalent￿). The EU adheres to the 
￿precautionary principal.￿ Regulators in the EU view GM and conventional varieties as 
differentiated products because of the perceived risks.  
 
These different perceptions of GM foods affect labeling requirements. In many 
countries, there are mandatory labeling requirements, while in others labeling remains 
voluntary￿differences that will have impacts all along the food chain, from seed 
producers to food retailers. The EU, Japan, Australia-New Zealand, Korea, Switzerland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, and Iceland all have some type of mandatory 
labeling regulations for GM foods. The European Commission has proposed a strict 
system of traceability for GMOs that may be approved and implemented in late 2002 or 
2003 (Sheldon 2002). In contrast, in the United States and Canada, there are no specific 
biotech requirements. Labeling is required only in cases where the product differs from 
its conventional counterpart in terms of allergenicity or nutritional content. But they are 
providing voluntary guidelines for those who wish to apply labels specifying non-GM. A 
detailed discussion of existing and pending legislation is not possible here, but the variety 
of labeling schemes in place or under consideration underlines the substantial differences 
between major exporters and importers on these issues.  
 
                                                 
9See Nielsen and Anderson (2000b), Kerr (1999), and Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson (2001) for discussions of 
these issues.  
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International agencies, such as the FAO Codex Alimentarius and Convention on 
Biodiversity are working to provide a basis for consistent and coherent approaches to GM 
product trade flows. Codex currently does not include agreed standards on GM foods. An 
Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force is focusing on developing guidance for risk 
analysis. There is also a committee on labeling to establish guidelines (Sheldon 2002). 
 
The Biosafety Protocol (or Cartagena Protocol), in particular Article 18, should 
provide for prescriptions for the handling, transport, packaging, and identification of 
modified living organisms. At present these are still under discussion and, in any case, 
will only apply once the treaty is ratified by at least 50 signatories. While the protocol 
recognizes the right of a country to authorize or restrict the import of living modified 
organisms after assessing the associated risks, these actions require studies undertaken in 
a scientific manner based on recognized risk assessment techniques. In cases where such 
knowledge is incomplete, countries are permitted to apply the ￿precautionary principle￿ 
and refuse imports if these are considered to avoid or minimize risks to human health or 
biodiversity. They are also permitted to take into account socio-economic considerations, 
provided these are consistent with their international agreements. To what extent the 
Biosafety Protocol will facilitate or stymie trade in biotech products is as yet uncertain as 
this depends on its interpretation. 
 
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) also have trade obligations 
that restrict the extent to which trade measures can be used against agricultural 
biotechnology without risking a case coming before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
The establishment of international standards for the production, regulation, and labeling 
of these products may be helpful as a way of reducing future trade disputes. Under the 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) agreement, a country may 




The emergence of GMOs in agricultural and food production introduces new 
issues that may emerge as trade disputes to be dealt with within the WTO. Sheldon 
(2002) notes that potential disputes may arise if a country such as the EU bans imports of 
a GM product, but allows imports of the conventional product. ￿The key issue in any 
GMO dispute will be the definition of ￿like goods￿, i.e. does either genetic modification 
or presence of GM ingredients constitute sufficient grounds for differentiation from 
conventional products.￿ (p. 166). According to the U.S. view that GM foods are 
substantially equivalent to conventional varieties, such an import ban would be 
discriminatory. 
 
The emergence of new GM technologies has generated a great deal of uncertainty 
and confusion in the policy debate, both nationally and internationally. Given this 
uncertainty, economic studies have focused on analyzing the nature of the potential costs 
                                                 
10 Some authors suggest that there is potential conflict between the Cartagena Protocol and WTO rules, 
which allows temporary restrictions relating to health and safety concerns in the absence of scientific 
evidence, but which requires that scientific studies be undertaken to substantiate the concerns. See Diaz-
Bonilla and Robinson (2001) and Nielsen and Andersen (2001b).   
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and benefits of adoption of the new technologies, under alternative scenarios regarding 
changes in consumer preferences and the nature of national and international regulation. 
 
3. Partial  Analysis 
 
Partial analyses of issues surrounding the introduction of GM technologies focus 
on individual commodities or particular issues, using partial equilibrium models or 
descriptive analysis. The studies do not put these issues in a global perspective, but rather 
provide more detail than the large, global trade models can include. The articles surveyed 
cover a diverse group of issues:  
•  The nature and magnitude of the actual and potential productivity gains due to the 
new technologies. 
•  Consumer attitudes towards GM products and willingness to pay for non-GM 
varieties. 
•  The costs associated with achieving market segmentation and identity 
preservation. 
•  The distribution of welfare gains and monopoly rents arising from the new 
technologies.  
 
Farmers have adopted agricultural biotechnology because they expect lower 
production costs, yield gains, and lower pesticide use. To date, there are limited measures 
of the extent of productivity gains. Marra, Pardey and Alston (2002) and Marra (2001) 
survey the farm level studies of transgenic crops in the U.S. They find three general 
conclusions concerning productivity effects by crop. First, transgenic cotton will require 
less pesticide use and will be profitable in most U.S. states in the Cotton Belt. Yields will 
improve in Bt corn. Finally, soybean production (primarily ￿Roundup Ready￿ varieties) 
will experience savings in pesticide and tillage costs. These cost advantages outweigh the 
slight yield loss observed for ￿Roundup Ready￿ soybeans. Marra et al. note that their 
conclusions about the productivity gains by sector are relevant only for the U.S. because 
most of the farm level studies were done for the U.S. 
 
Other studies note that the benefits of GM crops are mixed. For example, 
Shoemaker (2001) analyzes the effects of GM crops on yield, net return, and pesticide 
use, controlling for factors such as climate, pest management strategies, crop rotation, 
and tillage. She reports that herbicide tolerate cotton had statistically significant increases 
in yield and net return, but no significant change in herbicide use. Herbicide ￿tolerant 
soybeans generated small but statistically significant increases in yield and significant 
decreases in herbicide use. 
 
Desquilbet and Bullock (2002) focus on the cost of segmenting markets and 
labeling non-GM varieties. They analyze which producers bear the costs of identity 
preservation, and how farmers and handlers are differentiated with respect to these costs. 
To do so, they construct a partial equilibrium model of supply and demand built up from 
individual agents in the economy. They consider two types of costs. First, the costs in the 
production process to prevent co-mingling of GM and non-GM varieties. For example the  
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cost incurred to prevent cross-pollination and the costs of maintaining farm equipment 
dedicated to either GM or the non-GM varieties. The second type of costs involve 
convincing the purchaser that the product is GM-free. These costs include chemical 
testing and monitoring.  
 
They analyze the welfare implications of non-GM segregation and identity 
preservation using supply and demand analysis. They consider two vertically integrated 
markets, a market for agricultural products at the farm stage and a market for agricultural 
products at the handling stage. Three types of rapeseed are produced￿a non-GM variety, 
but for which no effort is made to prevent co-mingling with the GM variety, a GM 
variety, and a non-GM variety for which special efforts are made to prevent co-mingling 
with GM rapeseed. Handlers buy the rapeseed from farmers and produce either regular 
rapeseed or identity preserved (IP) rapeseed that is classified as non-GM. IP rapeseed can 
only use non-GM farm rapeseed in production. Consumers buy regular rapeseed and IP 
rapeseed from handlers. There are heterogeneous consumers, some get utility from 
consuming only IP rapeseed, while others are willing to consume either. In this 
framework, they consider three simultaneous shifts in supply and/or demand in three 
markets. First, GM technology lowers production costs for some subset of all farmers, 
shifting the supply curve. Second, some consumers may shift demand away from GM 
towards non-GM varieties. This preference shift will increase the demand for segregation 
and identity preservation of non-GM varieties. Farmers, handlers, and consumers are 
heterogeneous agents. This allows them to quantify welfare effects depending on various 
characteristics of the agents. The model also has two regions, the domestic market, 
modeled after the EU, and the rest of world. 
 
Desquilbet and Bullock consider two simulations. First, they introduce GM 
technology in the domestic market when consumers are indifferent between GM and non-
GM varieties. Then they introduce GM technology in conjunction with a shift in 
consumer preferences towards the non-GM variety and the need for identity preservation. 
In the first scenario, they find that the price of regular farm rapeseed declines by 0.7 
percent and handled supply of regular rapeseed increases by 1.5 percent. Domestic 
welfare increases by 78 million euros. When consumers shift away from GM rapeseed, 
the price of regular farm rapeseed declined by 2.7 percent and farm price of IP rapeseed 
is 7.6 percent higher than the price of farm rapeseed in the baseline. The price of handled 
IP rapeseed is 11 percent higher than the price of handled regular rapeseed. In the 
analysis, they identify different types of farmers, handlers and consumers who pay the 
costs of non-GM segregation and identity preservation. 
 
Other studies indicate the general magnitude of segregation costs. For example, 
Lin (2002) finds that, on average, across the surveyed elevators in the U.S., segregation 
could add $.22 per bushel for non-GM corn or 12 percent of the average farm price for 
corn, from country elevators to export ports. Lin further estimates that the cost of 
segregation for non-GM soybeans for the 2001-crop at about $0.18 per bushel for non-
GM soybeans (based on the high oil corn identity preservation (IP) system), or about 4 
percent of the average farm price of soybeans.  
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Lence and Hayes (2001) describe market conditions under which a premium price 
for non-GM or a discount for GM products will arise. They begin with the strong 
assumption that consumers who prefer non-GM products will consume GM varieties at a 
discount if there is not sufficient GM available. They argue that when the non-GM output 
share exceeds the demand share, there will be a relative surplus of non-GM products. The 
consumer who is indifferent will consume the GM product, the consumer who prefers 
non-GM products will pay a premium. 
 
A number of partial equilibrium models investigate the welfare implications of 
GM technology. For example, Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) evaluate the 
welfare effects of Roundup Ready Soybeans. For U.S. producers who use GM soybeans, 
trade allows them to exploit economies of scale. At the same time, monopoly producers 
sell the latest technology to countries that compete with U.S. soybean producers. The net 
effect GM technology has on the U.S. then depends on both the gains to U.S. producers 
and exporters, as well as the cost of increased competition from foreign producers to 
whom U.S. multinationals sell GM technology. Moschini et al ask how exports of U.S. 
technology affect U.S. producers and welfare. They find that U.S. welfare is slightly 
improved as Roundup Ready technology is exported.  
 
Other studies address demand issues. For example, James and Burton (2002) 
focus on consumer attitudes. They use choice modeling methods to determine the extent 
to which Australian consumers are willing to pay to avoid GM food. Their analysis 
provides a quantitative study to supplement qualitative studies which suggest that 
consumers in Western Europe and Japan are the most concerned about GM technology 
and those in the U.S. are the least concerned. They surveyed consumers, asking them to 
rank options (￿food baskets￿) with different combinations of attributes about production 
technology, the food bill, and the levels of health and environmental risks.
11  
 
They find that consumer willingness to pay to avoid GM foods varies by age and 
gender. It also varied by type of GM technology used to produce foods, with consumers 
more willing to pay to avoid products which used gene technology involving plants and 
animals as opposed to gene technology involving only plants. For example, for the 
average woman between ages 31 and 40 years of age, the average food bill would have to 
drop 18 percent before food produced with plant gene technology would be purchased. 
The food bill would have to drop 59 percent for this consumer to purchase food 
containing animal gene technology. They conclude that additional studies of consumer 
choice in different countries are necessary to better quantify demand for GM and non-
GM varieties. 
 
Also focusing on consumer choice issues, Giannakas and Fulton (2002) analyze 
the effect of genetically modified foods on the purchasing decisions of consumers and 
welfare under different assumptions about labeling. They develop a model with 
heterogeneous consumers who differ in the utility derived from the consumption of GM 
foods and therefore have a different willingness to pay for GM products. They find that 
                                                 
11 Note that consumer attitude studies may not necessarily predict market behavior. Consumers may not 
have responded truthfully because of the hypothetical nature of their choices.  
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the greater the segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling, ￿no labeling￿ is 
more likely to be the superior regime. When consumers have a high aversion to GM 
foods, and there is little price reduction for GM foods, mandatory labeling is a rational 
outcome. 
 
4.  Global Trade Models 
 
The multi-country, computable general equilibrium (CGE) trade models surveyed 
below focus on different countries and sectors. They also incorporate different 
assumptions about: (1) how GM technology affects productivity; (2) the transfer of GM-
technology across countries; (3) market segmentation; and (4) the nature of the shift in 
consumer preferences in developed countries. All these models are based on world trade 
and production data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) based at Purdue 
University. The project has gathered social accounting matrices (SAMs) for a large 
number of countries and also detailed international trade data by sector, consistent with 
the country SAM data.
12 
 
The models, the scenarios they analyze, and their key findings are summarized in 
the appendix. We expand on the summary in the table in the discussion below.  
Anderson and Yao (2001) 
 
Anderson and Yao evaluate the effect of China developing GM technology. They 
note that China has been investing heavily in biotech research and development since the 
1980s. They allow GM technology to improve productivity in four crops, rice, cotton, 
corn and soybeans. They also take into account that some countries￿North America, the 
Southern Cone of South America (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) and Southeast Asia￿
already use GM technology in these crops. When they discuss the benefits to China of 
adopting GM technology, they note that these gains would be less if they took into 
account the research and development costs. 
 
They conclude that China will gain from GM technology if there are no 
environmental externalities and no adverse consumer reactions. They find that the 
welfare gains from GM adoption depend on retaining market access abroad. Market 
access is important for direct sale of GM products and indirect links via the sale of 
products such as textiles and apparel which use a GM-potential input in production. 
However, one must also account for the cost of R&D development that are not included 
in the welfare measure they report. Furthermore, adverse consumer reactions will reduce 
the benefits of adopting GM technology in China. China, as a new WTO member, has 
incentive to ensure that the GM debate does not lead to excessive denial of market access 
for GM products. 
 
                                                 
12 The GTAP project also includes global modeling software, which some of the articles use in specifying 
and solving their models. See Hertel (1997). Others use different modeling software, typically the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). Both are flexible modeling systems that are widely used.   
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Huang et al. (2002) 
 
  Huang et al. also evaluate the effects of GM technology on China￿s production 
and trade. They use productivity estimates that are based on empirical micro-level data 
for the cotton sector and experimental data for the rice sector in China. They use the 
GTAP model, with baseline projections for 2010. This allows them to incorporate 
changes future changes in China that are important for its trade relations: China￿s 
accession to the WTO between 2002 and 2005; global phase out of the Multifiber 
Agreement by January 2005; and EU enlargement. 
 
  Huang et al. consider four policy scenarios. First they consider the effects of 
factor-biased productivity growth in cotton, based on empirical estimates. They find that 
the price of cotton declines by 10.9 percent. This affects trade in textiles because textile 
costs decline 0.27 percent. Output and exports of textiles increase 0.7 percent and 0.9 
percent respectively.  
 
When rice also benefits from a productivity gain due to GM technology, the price 
declines by 12 percent in 2010. The welfare effects of GM technology (in both cotton and 
rice) are substantial: annual income increases 5 billion US $ in 2010 or about 3.5 US $ 
per person.  
 
Next, they consider the implications of a negative consumer response in China￿s 
major rice export markets, Japan, Korea, the enlarged EU, and South East Asia. They 
find that exports of GM rice from China drop substantially (however this is from a low 
base since rice exports are only 1.2 percent of production). There is a slight decline in 
output growth for China, however, the overall negative effect is small, most of the 
benefits of GM technology are realized within China. 
 
Finally, they consider the effect of labeling GM rice, to be consistent with China￿s 
demand that GM soybean imports from the U.S. are labeled as such. They model the 
effect of labeling as an increase in the cost of services required for rice production, 
assuming a total increase in production costs due to labeling to be 3 percent. They find 
that labeling is costly in terms of welfare. The welfare loss to China is 1.3 billion US$ 
because labeling raises the domestic price of GM rice, hurting consumers. 
Nielsen and Anderson (2001a) 
 
Like both Anderson and Yao (2001) and Huang et al. (2002), , Nielsen and 
Anderson (2001a) use the GTAP model to evaluate the effect of GMO productivity 
increases in maize and soybean production. They include China in the set of countries 
that use GM technology and apply GM-driven productivity growth of 5 percent in coarse 
grain (excluding wheat and rice) and oilseeds to North America, Mexico, the Southern 
Cone region of Latin America, India, China, Rest of East Asia (excluding Japan and the 
East Asian newly industrialized countries, or NICs), and South Africa. Other countries 
are assumed to refrain from the use of GM crops in their production systems￿the EU  
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from choice and Sub-Sahara Africa because they are assumed not to be able to gain 
access to the technology. 
 
Nielsen and Anderson focus on policy choices and consumer reactions to GM 
foods. The scenario first is a base case with no policy or consumer reactions to them. The 
others (scenarios 2 and 3) impose on this base case a policy or consumer response in 
Western Europe. In scenario 2, Western Europe not only refrains from using GM crops in 
its own domestic production systems, but the region is also assumed to reject imports of 
genetically modified oilseeds and coarse grains from GM-adopting regions. Scenario 3 
considers the case in which consumers express their preferences through market 
mechanisms rather than through government regulation. 
 
A 5% reduction in overall production costs in these sectors leads to increases in 
coarse grain production of between 0.4% and 2.1%, and increases in oilseed production 
of between 1.1% and 4.6%, in the GM-adopting regions. The production responses are 
generally larger for oilseeds as compared with coarse grain. This is because a larger share 
of oilseed production as compared with coarse grain production is destined for export 
markets in all the reported regions, and hence oilseed production is not limited to the 
same extent by domestic demand. Increased oilseed production leads to lower market 
prices and hence cheaper costs of production in the vegetable oils and fats sectors, 
expanding output there. This expansion is particularly marked in the Southern Cone 
region of South America, which exports a large share of production. In North America, 
maize is also used as livestock feed, and hence the lower feed prices lead to an expansion 
of the livestock and meat processing sectors there.  
 
Due to the very large world market shares of oilseeds from North and South 
America and coarse grain from North America, the increased supply from these regions 
causes world prices for coarse grain and oilseeds to decline by 4.0% and 4.5%, 
respectively. As a consequence of the more intense competition from abroad, production 
of coarse grain and oilseeds declines in the non-adopting regions. This is particularly so 
in Western Europe, a major net importer of oilseeds, of which about half comes from 
North America. Cereal grain imports into Western Europe increase only slightly (0.1%), 
but the increased competition and lower price are enough to entail a 4.5% decline in 
Western European production. In the developing countries too, production of coarse grain 
and oilseeds is reduced slightly. The changes in India, however, are relatively small 
compared with e.g. China and the Southern Cone region. This is explained by the 
domestic market orientation of these sales.  
 
Global economic welfare (as traditionally measured in terms of equivalent 
variations of income, ignoring any externalities) is boosted in this first scenario by 
US$9.9 billion per year, two-thirds of which are enjoyed by the adopting regions. All 
regions (both adopting and non-adopting) gain in terms of economic welfare except Sub-
Saharan Africa (a non-adopter). Most of this gain stems directly from the technology 
boost. The net-exporting GM-adopters experience worsened terms of trade due to 
increased competition on world markets, but this adverse welfare effect is outweighed by 
the positive effect of the technological boost. Western Europe gains from the productivity  
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increase in the other regions only in part because of cheaper imports; mostly it gains 
because increased competition from abroad shifts domestic resources out of relatively 
highly assisted segments of EU agriculture. The group of other high-income countries, 
among which are East Asian nations that are relatively large net importers of the GM-
potential crops, benefits equally from lower import prices and a more efficient use of 
resources in domestic farm production.  
 
Next, Nielsen and Anderson consider the scenario in which Western Europe not 
only refrains from using GM crops in its own domestic production systems, but the 
region is also assumed to reject imports of genetically modified oilseeds and coarse grain 
from GM-adopting regions. This assumes that the labelling requirements of the Biosafety 
Protocol (UNEP 2000) enable Western European importers to identify such shipments 
and that all oilseed and coarse grain exports from GM-adopting regions will be labelled 
￿may contain GMOs￿. Under those conditions, the distinction between GM-inclusive and 
GM-free products is simplified to one that relates directly to the country of origin, and 
labelling costs are ignored.
 13 This import-ban scenario reflects the most extreme 
application of the precautionary principle within the framework of the Biosafety Protocol. 
 
A Western European ban on the imports of genetically modified coarse grain and 
oilseeds changes the situation in scenario 1 dramatically, especially for the oilseed sector 
in North America which is highly dependent on the EU market. The result of the 
European ban is not only a decline in total North American oilseed exports by almost 
30%, but also a production decline of 10%, pulling resources such as land out of this 
sector. For coarse grain, by contrast, only 18% of North American production is exported 
and just 8% of those exports are destined for Western Europe. Therefore the ban does not 
affect North American production and exports of maize to the same extent as for 
soybean, although the downward pressure on the international price of maize nonetheless 
dampens significantly the production-enhancing effect of the technological boost. Similar 
effects are evident in the other GM adopting regions, except for India￿once again 
because its production of these crops is virtually all sold domestically and so is not 
greatly affected by market developments abroad. 
 
For Sub-Saharan Africa, which by assumption is unable to adopt the new GM 
technology, access to the Western European markets when other competitors are 
excluded expands. Oilseed exports from this region rise by enough to increase domestic 
production by 4%. Contrary to the Blair House Agreement, this study finds that Western 
Europe increases its own production of oilseeds, however, so the aggregate increase in its 
oilseed imports amounts to less than 1%. Its production of coarse grain also increases, but 
not by as much because of an initial high degree of self-sufficiency. Europe￿s shift from 
imported oilseeds and coarse grain to domestically produced products has implications 
further downstream. Given an imperfect degree of substitution in production between 
                                                 
13 By distinguishing between GMO-inclusive and GMO-free products by country of origin, one concern 
may be that GM-adopting regions channel their exports to the country or region imposing the import ban 
(here Western Europe) through third countries that are indifferent as to the content of GMOs and that do 
not adopt GM technology in their own production systems. The possibility of such transshipments is 
abstracted from in this analysis.   
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domestic and imported intermediate inputs, the higher prices of domestically produced 
maize and soybean mean that livestock feed is slightly more expensive. (Half of 
intermediate demand for coarse grain in Western Europe stems from the livestock sector.) 
Inputs to other food processing industries, particularly the vegetable oils and fats sector, 
also are more expensive. As a consequence, production in these downstream sectors 
decline and competing imports increase.  
 
Aggregate welfare implications of this scenario are substantially different from 
those of scenario 1. Western Europe now experiences a decline in aggregate economic 
welfare of US$4.3 billion per year instead of a boost of $2 billion. Consumer welfare in 
Western Europe is reduced in this scenario because, given that those consumers are 
assumed to be indifferent between GM-inclusive and GM-free products, the import ban 
restricts them from benefiting from lower international prices. Bear in mind, though, that 
in this as in the previous scenarios it is assumed citizens are indifferent to GMOs. To the 
extent that some Western Europeans in fact value a ban on GM products in their domestic 
markets that would partially offset the loss in economic welfare. 
 
The key exporters of the GM products, Northern America, Southern Cone, and 
China, all show a smaller welfare gain in this scenario compared with the scenario in 
which there is no European policy response. Net importers of corn and soybeans (e.g. 
￿Other high-income￿ which is mostly East Asia), by contrast, are slightly better off in this 
scenario than in scenario 1. Meanwhile, the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are affected 
in a slightly positive instead of slightly negative way, gaining from better terms of trade. 
In particular, a higher price is obtained for their oilseed exports to Western European 
markets compared with scenario 1. 
 
Two-thirds of the global gain from the new GM technology as measured in 
scenario 1 would be eroded by an import ban imposed by Western Europe: it falls from 
$9.9 billion per year to just $3.4 billion, with almost the entire erosion in economic 
welfare borne in Western Europe (assuming as before that consumers are indifferent 
between GM-free and GM-inclusive foods). The rest is borne by the net-exporting 
adopters (mainly North America and the Southern Cone region). Since the non-adopting 
regions generally purchase most of their imported coarse grain and oilseeds from the 
North American region, they benefit even more than in scenario 1 from lower import 
prices: their welfare is estimated to be greater by almost one-fifth in the case of a Western 
European import ban as compared with no European reaction. 
 
As an alternative to a policy response, Nielsen and Anderson also consider a shift 
in European preferences away from imported coarse grain and oilseeds and in favour of 
domestically produced crops. The scenario is implemented as an exogenous 25% 
reduction in final consumer and intermediate demand for all imported oilseeds and coarse 
grain (that is, not only those which can be identified as coming from GM-adopting 
regions). Some European consumers and firms are assumed to choose to completely 
avoid products that are produced outside Western Europe. That import demand is shifted 
to domestically produced goods. Western European producers and suppliers are assumed 
to be able to signal￿at no additional cost￿that their products are GM-free by e.g.  
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labelling their products by country of origin. This is possible because it is assumed that 
no producers in Western Europe adopt GM crops (perhaps due to government 
regulation), and hence such a label would be perceived as a sufficient guarantee of the 
absence of GMOs.  
 
Having consumers express their preferences through market mechanisms (which 
presumes labelling) rather than through a government-implemented import ban has a 
much less damaging effect on production in the GM-adopting countries. In particular, 
instead of declines in oilseed production as in scenario 2 there are slight increases in this 
scenario, and production responses in coarse grain are slightly larger. As expected, 
domestic oilseed production in Western Europe must increase somewhat to accommodate 
the shift in preferences, but not nearly to the same extent as in the previous scenario. 
Furthermore, there are in fact minor price reductions for agri-food products in Western 
Europe in part because (by assumption) the shift in preferences is only partial, and so 
some consumers and firms do benefit from lower import prices. In other words, in 
contrast to the previous scenario, a certain link between EU prices and world prices is 
retained here because we are dealing with only a partial reduction in import demand. The 
output growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in scenario 2, by taking the opportunity of serving 
European consumers and firms while other suppliers were excluded, is replaced in this 
scenario by declines: Sub-Saharan Africa loses export shares to the GM-adopting regions. 
van Meijl and van Tongeren (2001) 
 
Van Meijl and van Tongeren (2001), like Anderson and Yao (2001) and Nielsen 
and Anderson (2001a), use the GTAP model to evaluate the effect of a GM productivity 
shock. They consider the effects of GM technology in maize and soybeans. Unlike the 
other studies, van Meijl and van Tongeren have a different type of productivity shock for 
each crop. For maize, studies indicate that GM technology increases yield. They model 
this as a Hicks-neutral productivity growth at 5%, following Nielsen and Anderson 
(2001a). For soybeans, there is savings on inputs of chemicals and labor￿this is modeled 
as a five percent chemical cum labor augmenting technical change in that sector. Also 
similar to previous studies, van Meijl and van Tongeren consider the effect of changes in 
consumer attitudes, modeled as an import ban. 
 
Their analysis differs from the other studies in two ways. First, they model spread 
of GM technology as an endogenous knowledge spillover linked to trade flows and 
country characteristics. They begin from the premise that knowledge is embodied in 
traded goods and that is how it travels between countries. ￿The international diffusion of 
these technologies is not perfect but dependent on trade linkages, absorption, capacity, 
size of farms and whether a technology is socially acceptable. If a production technology 
is not socially acceptable then a country is excluded from these potentially productivity 
gains that are already less than perfect.￿ (p.2) For example, following a 5 percent 
productivity increase in North America (Hicks neutral for maize, factor-biased for 
soybeans), Argentina receives an increase  a 70 percent productivity growth. The 
potential spillovers for developing countries are smaller because their farm size is too 
small and or education is too low to adopt GM technology profitably.   




 In contrast, Anderson and Yao (2001) note that a country must pay for research 
and development (R&D) to acquire GM technology. Since China has undertaken such 
(R&D), they consider the global effects of including China as a GM-adopter. 
 
They also differ from other studies because they include the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). The CAP shields EU farmers from world market price 
developments. So if world prices for grains decline, as a result of GM technology in the 
major exporters, the lower world prices do not necessarily trigger a substitution of EU 
demand towards imported varieties. 
 
Acknowledging the similarity of their model to Nielsen and Anderson (2001a), 
they focus their discussion on the ￿new￿ information, endogenous international 
knowledge transfers. From the base scenario, GM adoption by North America (NAM), 
they show the potential knowledge spillovers (potential because social acceptance is not 
accounted for), shown as the percent productivity shock (NAM received 5%) they can 
apply to the GM sectors. Australia/New Zealand potentially receive full spillovers 
because their farm size and education level exceeds the threshold levels. Argentina and 
EU potentially receive 70% or 60%; they have relatively highly educated farmers (like 
NAM), but average farm size is lower. Potential spillovers to developing countries are 
smaller because they trade less chemical with NAM, their farm size is too small and/or 
education level is too low to adopt the new GM technologies profitably. 
 
They discuss the effects of spillovers on production in the non-innovating 
countries. When North America innovates, and there are no spillovers, output of coarse 
grains and oilseeds expands in the innovating country and contracts in all other countries. 
With spillovers, other countries also get a part of the productivity increase. The 
knowledge receiving countries either do not see output decline as much or see an 
increase. 
 
Next, they consider production and farm income impact of alternative EU policy 
responses to GMOs. With the CAP, the EU is isolated from the downward pressures on 
prices brought about by the global productivity boost. When the EU does not accept 
GMO production technologies, there is no internal productivity gain. Production and 
farm income do not change. They note that this contrasts to Nielsen and Anderson (2001) 
who find a sharp reduction in coarse grain output. They argue that Nielsen and Anderson 
do not represent the CAP so overstate the negative production effect of not adopting GM 
technology in the EU. However, van Meijl and Van Tongeren do not discuss the effect of 
GM technology on the program cost of the CAP. Depending on the nature of the 
productivity shock and price decline in GM-adopting countries, the CAP expenditures 
may become too expensive to maintain.
14 
 
                                                 
14 Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) analyzed a similar case of interdependent trade and domestic 
policy in Mexico, where the government sought to insulate corn producers from world market prices. When 
faced with cheap imports from the U.S. (due to tariff elimination as part of NAFTA), Mexico￿s program 
costs became exorbitant.  
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Nielsen, Robinson and Thierfelder (2001) 
 
Nielsen, Robinson and Thierfelder (2001) also model the production and trade 
effects when countries adopt GM technology. The model (referred to as the NRT model) 
is more aggregated than the GTAP model used in Nielsen and Anderson (2001a) with 
seven regions and ten sectors, but has many features in common with the GTAP model.
15 
The NRT model introduces GM varieties by segmenting the coarse grain and oilseed 
sectors into GM and non-GM lines of production. In contrast to the GTAP- based models, 
in which a country produces either the GM or non-GM variety exclusively, the NRT 
model allows a country to produce both varieties in response to market conditions. This 
segregation is introduced based on a notion that there may be a viable market for 
guaranteed GMO-free products alongside the new GMO-inclusive varieties if the GMO-
critical consumers are willing to pay a price premium. Depending on the strength of 
opposition toward GM products in important markets and the costs of segregating 
agricultural markets, developing and developed countries alike may benefit from 
segregated agricultural markets, which will have different prices. Such a market 
development would be analogous to the niche markets for organic foods. 
 
In the base data used for this model analysis, it is assumed that all regions initially 
produce some of both the GM and non-GM varieties of oilseeds and coarse grain. The 
assumed GM shares of production, based on estimates provided in James (1999) and 
USDA (2000), are just 10% in all but three regions. The exceptions are the Americas and 
developing Asian countries where it is assumed 40% of coarse grain and 60% of oilseeds 
(90% in South America) use GM technology.
16  
 
In the NRT model the decisions of producers and consumers to use GM versus  
non-GM varieties in production and final demand are endogenous. The input-output 
choice is also endogenous for four demanders of coarse grain and oilseeds: livestock, 
meat& dairy, vegetable oils & fats, and other processed food sectors. Intermediate 
demands for each composite group (i.e. GM plus non-GM) are held fixed as proportions 
of output. In this way, the initial input-output coefficients remain fixed, but for oilseeds 
and coarse grains, a choice has been introduced for GM and non-GM varieties. Other 
intermediate input demands remain in fixed proportions to output. Similarly, final 
consumption of each composite GM-potential good is also fixed as a share of total 
demand, with an endogenous choice between GM and non-GM varieties. 
 
Since the available estimates of agronomic and hence economic benefits to 
producers from cultivating GM crops are few and very diverse, NRT simply assume the 
GM oilseed and GM coarse grain sectors in all regions have a 10% higher level of 
primary factor productivity as compared with their non-GM (conventional) counterparts. 
This shock is slightly different from the shock imposed in the three GTAP model 
                                                 
15 The NRT model is implemented in the GAMS software and is solved in levels rather than in log 
differentials (as in the GTAP model software).  
16 The numbers for South America reflect GM use in Argentina. For Brazil, the adoption rate is much 
lower.  
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scenarios: it is twice the size, but it is applied only to primary factor inputs and not to 
intermediate input use. 
 
A shift in consumer preference for the GM-variety is modeled as a change in the 
substitution elasticities for GM and non-GM products in two of the most GM-critical 
regions, Western Europe and High-income Asia. As consumers perceive GM and non-
GM varieties as bad substitutes, the GM-variety must sell at more of a discount to induce 
consumers to purchase it. To incorporate this preference change, the factor productivity 
shock in the GM sectors is performed against a variety of base models, which differ in 
terms of substitution elasticities for GM and non-GM products in the two most GM-
critical regions. Initially, it is assumed that the elasticity of substitution between GM and 
non-GM varieties is high and equal in all regions. Then, in order to reflect the fact that 
citizens in Western Europe and High-income Asia are skeptical of the new GM varieties, 
the elasticities of substitution between the GM and non-GM varieties are gradually 
lowered so that GM and non-GM varieties are seen as increasingly poorer substitutes in 
production and consumption in these particular regions.
17 Citizens in all other regions are 
assumed to be indifferent, and hence the two crops remain highly substitutable in 
consumption and production there.  
 
In all scenarios, output of GM varieties increases and output of non-GM varieties 
declines, due to the productivity shock to the GM varieties. However, the magnitude of 
the change depends on consumer preferences in Western Europe and Japan, two 
important export markets for the GM producing regions. For example, the North America 
region is very sensitive to changes in preferences toward GMOs because it is the world￿s 
largest exporter of both oilseeds and coarse grains, and it is particularly dependent on the 
GM-critical markets for these exports. Total exports of the GM varieties decline as GM 
and non-GM substitutability worsens in the GM-critical regions, especially for oilseeds 
because almost 80% of North American oilseeds exports are initially sold in these 
markets.  
 
In response to the changing preferences, exports of the non-GM varieties increase. 
These changes are reflected in North America￿s production results. Western Europe is an 
important importer of oilseeds. At the extreme, where Western Europeans are 
unconcerned about the GM or non-GM status of crops used in production, imports 
increase dramatically in response to lower world market prices. As substitutability is 
reduced, GM-imports and production plunge while non-GM imports and production 
increase.  
 
The consumer preference shift also affects developing countries. For example, 
GM-oilseed exports from South America (an extensive GM adopter) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (a region with a low share of GM varieties in total production) initially increase 
due to the factor productivity shock. Total GM-oilseed exports decline following as 
preferences in High-income Asia and Western Europe turn against GMOs. Furthermore, 
GM-exports are redirected from the GM critical regions and spread evenly over the other 
                                                 
17 NRT use elasticity of substitution values ranging from 0.5 to 5.0. The purpose is to show the impact of 
GM technology for different preferences. It is difficult to find empirical estimates in the literature.  
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importing regions. Of South America￿s total oilseed exports, 84% are initially sold on 
GM critical markets as compared with 58% of oilseed exports from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The adjustment in total GM oilseed exports is therefore relatively larger for South 
America. As expected, the exports of non-GM oilseeds from these two regions are 
generally being diverted toward the GM-critical regions and away from other regions. 
 
Both South America and Sub-Saharan Africa depend on imports for almost one-
tenth of their total cereal grain absorption. However, in terms of sources, South America 
depends almost entirely on North America for its imports, while imports into Sub-
Saharan Africa come from North America (50%), Western Europe (16%), and the Rest of 
World (28%). Because citizens of South America and Sub-Saharan Africa are assumed to 
be uncritical of GMO content, total GM cereal grain imports increase as preferences in 
Western Europe and High-income Asia turn against GMOs. This is because GM exports 
are now increasingly directed to non-critical markets (i.e. fewer markets), and so the 
import price declines even further than the price decline due to the factor productivity 
shock. Imports of GM crops from the GM critical countries of course decline drastically 
as production of GM crops in these regions declines. For the non-GM varieties, imports 
from the GM-critical regions increase marginally as substitutability in those regions 
worsens and they respond by producing more of the non-GM variety. Given competition 
from increased supplies of GM crops, prices of non-GM crops also fall, and so South 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa also face declining prices on non-GM imports from the 
GM-critical regions as preferences shift.  
 
Low-income Asia is a net importer of both oilseeds and cereal grains. Most of 
these imports (89% of oilseeds and 83% of cereal grains) come from North and South 
America. Total imports of GM crops into this region increase slightly as preferences turn 
against GMOs in Western Europe and High-income Asia. Once again, this is because the 
redirection of GM export crops means increased supplies on fewer markets and hence 
prices decline even further. 
 
The bilateral trade results summarized above show that, while trade diversion is 
significant, markets can adjust to accommodate the differences in tastes across countries. 
This favorable outcome is driven by the price differential that results between the two 
crop varieties. The price wedges that arise as a consequence of the different levels of 
factor productivity in GM and non-GM crop production are between 4.0% and 6.6%, 
varying across crops and regions. In the GM critical regions, the non-GM/GM price ratio 
increases as citizens there become increasingly skeptical. In North America, the price 
wedge is generally small, and it declines as GM and non-GM substitutability worsens in 
the other high-income countries. Given that North America is the world￿s largest 
producer and exporter of both crops, when there is high substitutability in all regions, 
prices of both varieties decline ￿ the GM price declines due to the productivity shock, 
while the non-GM price declines because of increased competition in the GM-indifferent 
markets. In an effort to retain access to the GM critical markets, North American 
production of non-GM varieties increases as citizens of the GM critical regions become 
increasingly skeptical of GMOs. 
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With the exception of oilseeds in South America, the price wedges in the 
developing countries are unaffected by the preference changes in the Western Europe and 
High-income Asia. Thus it is the productivity differential that determines the price wedge 
in developing countries, not preference shifts in the GM critical regions. When 
developing countries are indifferent to the GM content of agricultural products (whether 
produced domestically or imported) and obtain most of their imports from countries that 
are extensive adopters of GM crops, they gain substantially from lower import prices. 
 
Global economic welfare (i.e. absorption) is estimated by the NRT model to 
increase by US$12 billion per year when GM coarse grain and oilseed production 
processes experience a 10% primary factor productivity increase, given the assumed 
regional shares of GM and non-GM varieties. As preferences in Western Europe and 
High-income Asia turn against GM varieties, this increase is reduced to $11 billion. 
South America, North America, and Low-income Asia are the main beneficiaries of the 
factor productivity increase, because they all are assumed to be intense adopters of the 
productivity-increasing crop varieties. North America gains as the major producer and 
exporter of both crops. The total absorption gain in this region is reduced, but only by 5% 
relative to the high substitutability experiment, as a consequence of changing preferences 
in its important export markets in Western Europe and High-income Asia.  
 
As with the import ban and preference shift scenarios in Nielsen and Anderson, 
these results also show that the ￿costs￿ of the preference changes are borne mainly by the 
GM-critical regions themselves, with the gains made in High-income Asia (in terms of 
lower import prices) basically disappearing. In Western Europe, the initial boost in total 
absorption is cut in half. In particular, the increases in total absorption in all the 
developing country regions are not affected by the preference changes in the GM-critical 
regions. Low-income Asia is the major beneficiary in absolute terms, being both a net 
importer of the two crops and basically indifferent as to GM content. Hence the region 
benefits from substantially lower import prices on GM crops. Despite the high 
dependence on the GM critical regions for its exports of oilseeds, the increase in total 
absorption in South America is unaffected by the preference changes there because 
bilateral trade flows adjust well￿trade diversion offsets the effects of demand shifts in 
the GM-critical regions. In Sub-Saharan Africa the gains are small in absolute terms, 
mainly due to the small share of these particular crops in production and trade, but they 
are also unaffected by preference changes in GM-critical regions. 
Nielsen, Thierfelder and Robinson (2001) 
 
Nielsen, Thierfelder and Robinson expand on the previous paper in two ways. 
First, they segment both the farm and processed food sectors. In the earlier paper, the 
processed food sectors had an endogenous choice between GM and non-GM intermediate 
inputs and used a combination of both. Here, non-GM processed foods use only non-GM 
farm products as intermediate inputs, and similarly for GM varieties. The assumption is 
that there is full market segmentation, with identity preservation through the processing 
chain, from the intermediate input to the final product. Second, they expand the treatment 
of consumer preferences to include a structural shift￿regardless of the price differential,  
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some consumers turn against GM foods and their consumption share declines. They find 
that this specification of changes in consumer preferences has a dramatic impact on the 
gains from adoption of GM technology. 
 
In their specification, the GM-adopting cereal grains and oilseed sectors are 
assumed to make more productive use of the primary factors of production as compared 
with the non-GM sectors, following the treatment in the NRT model. In addition, there is 
some evidence that cultivating GM varieties substantially reduces the use of chemical 
pesticides and herbicides (e.g. Pray et al. 2001). Based on this work, the use of chemicals 
in the GM oilseed and GM cereal grain production is reduced by 30%.
18 
 
The starting point for the consumer preference experiments is that food products 
come in two varieties, distinguished by their method of production: GM and non-GM. 
The model has a representative consumer who views these two varieties as imperfect 
substitutes. Three different consumer response scenarios are examined. In the base case, 
consumers in all countries are relatively indifferent with respect to the introduction of 
GM techniques in food production, and so find GM and non-GM food varieties to be 
highly substitutable. 
 
The next two scenarios attempt to capture the fact that citizens in Western Europe 
and High-income Asia dislike the idea of genetically modified foods. In the second 
scenario this dislike is captured by lowering the elasticities of substitution between the 
GM and non-GM varieties for consumers in these two regions, precisely as in the NRT 
model. Citizens in all other regions are basically indifferent, and hence the two varieties 
remain fairly substitutable in consumption.  
 
In some countries, irrespective of how cheap these products may become (relative 
to non-GM foods), some consumers may simply not want to consume GM foods. In the 
third scenario, consumers are assumed to change the ratio of GM to non-GM foods 
demanded at initial prices￿a structural shift in their expenditure pattern. Consumers 
spend the same amount on consumption of food, but the composition is changed in favor 
of non-GM varieties, even with no change in prices. In the scenario, the GM share of 
foods in consumption in Western Europe and High-income Asia is reduced to 2%. 
 
In general, the results are very similar to the NRT model when the changes in 
consumer preferences are treated the same in the two models￿as a decrease in the 
elasticity of substitution￿and will not be discussed further here. In the final scenario, 
where consumers in Western Europe and High-income Asia turn against genetically 
                                                 
18 The assumed savings in intermediate costs are not as important as the assumptions about overall 
productivity improvements. At this point, both should be seen as educated guesses based on scanty and 
preliminary evidence. The increase in factor productivity and the reduced need for chemicals in the GM 
cereal grain and oilseed sectors will cause the cost-driven prices of these crops to decline. The magnitude 
of this price decline in the different sectors and regions will differ, depending on the shares of primary 
production factors and chemicals in total production costs. In sectors and regions where these costs make 
up a large share of total costs, the impact of the productivity shock in terms of lower supply prices will be 
greater than in sectors and regions where the share is smaller. Intermediate users of GM inputs (the GM 
livestock and GM processed food producers) will benefit from lower input prices.  
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modified foods, the resulting changes are much more dramatic compared with assuming 
only reduced price sensitivity. The price of GM varieties in the GMO-critical countries 
declines further because of the almost complete rejection of these products, whereas the 
price of non-GM foods increases. This leads to substantially larger price wedges in the 
GM-critical regions as compared with the previous scenarios. The larger price wedges 
between GM and non-GM primary crops follow through the entire food processing chain. 
The price increase for non-GM foods is, however, moderated by the fact that there are 
markets for non-GM products in all regions in the model, so consumers are not closing 
themselves off to necessary goods, nor are they required to produce all the non-GM 
goods themselves. The model allows all countries to produce both varieties and hence 
supply both GMO-indifferent and GMO-critical consumers.
19  
 
Total U.S. GM cereal grain and oilseed exports fall by no less than ￿17% and ￿
33%, respectively. Instead, exports of the non-GM varieties increase by 10% and 16%, 
respectively. These changes are a direct reaction to the relative prices obtainable on their 
key export markets, namely High-income Asia and Western Europe. The prices of GM 
cereal grains and oilseeds on these markets plummets and the prices of non-GM varieties 
increase slightly. The price decline for GM cereal grains in Western Europe is not as 
large as for oilseeds because this region is less dependent on imports of these crops, 
relatively speaking. 
 
For Low-income Asia and South America, exports of GM oilseeds decline, 
similar to the export response in the U.S. However, exports of GM cereal grains still 
expand. These countries are less dependent on GM-critical regions for cereal grains than 
is the U.S. For example, South America sends 92 % of its cereal grain exports to the 
Cairns Group. 
 
Changing consumer attitudes in Western Europe and High-income Asia also 
affect Sub-Saharan Africa￿s trade patterns. While that region is not an intense GM-
adopter, it does have strong trade ties to Western Europe. Its imports of GM processed 
products declines, despite the fact that it is not a GM-critical region. Instead, its major 
import source changes its production patterns and therefore the structure of its exports. 
 
Imports of GM cereal grain and oilseeds into Western Europe and High-income 
Asia decline substantially (between ￿57% and ￿71%). These decreases in quantities are 
accompanied by import price declines in the order of ￿21% to ￿26%. Conversely, imports 
of non-GM crops increase substantially, at slightly higher prices. The sourcing of these 
non-GM crop imports is spread across all regions, because in the model all regions are 
assumed to be able to produce both varieties and to be able to credibly verify this 
characteristic to importers. Clearly, this is a simplification of reality, and one can easily 
imagine that for some regions, living up to the principles of identity preservation and 
verifying this is very costly, thereby putting them at a cost disadvantage. Such effects are 
not captured in this model. The increases in non-GM cereal grain and oilseed imports are 
supplemented by increases in own production in both High-income Asia and Western 
Europe. 
                                                 
19 The underlying assumption is that there is labeling and successful market segmentation.   




In the structural shift experiment, the production of GM oilseeds in the U.S. 
declines by ￿15%, in spite of the factor productivity gain and the reduced chemical 
requirements. The direction of the effect is the opposite of that in the first two scenarios. 
Because the U.S. is so highly dependent on exporting to the GM-critical markets, a 
structural change in consumer preferences has much more of an impact on this region￿s 
trading opportunities compared with the reduced price sensitivity experiment.  
 
An interesting question is whether these changing preferences in Western Europe 
and High-income Asia can open opportunities for developing countries to export non-GM 
varieties of cereal grains and oilseeds to these regions. Sub-Saharan Africa has some 
production of oilseeds, for example, and although exports of these crops do not account 
for a significant share of total production value at present, they might if niche markets for 
non-GM crops develop in Western Europe. Similarly, Low-income Asian countries might 
look into expanding their production of e.g. non-GM oilseeds if nearby niche markets in 
High-income Asian countries develop. 
 
Although the differences are very small, comparing production results from the 
three scenarios indicates that pursuing niche markets might be beneficial if the price 
premiums obtainable for non-GM varieties are large enough to outweigh the relative 
decline in productivity and any identity preservation and labeling costs. But even more 
significant in value terms for these countries are exports of processed foods, i.e. vegetable 
oils and fats, meat and dairy products, and other processed foods. For a region like Sub-
Saharan Africa, with strong ties to Western Europe, changing consumer attitudes toward 
GM foods may be an important determinant of future decisions regarding genetic 
engineering in food production. Production of GM processed food products expands in 
the first two scenarios, but declines in the structural shift third scenario. In the third 
scenario, the increase in demand for non-GM processed foods in the EU determines the 
pattern of production 
5. Conclusion 
 
The world trade models surveyed differ in country and sector focus. They also 
incorporate different assumptions about how GM technology affects markets, with 
alternative treatments of market segmentation. One set of models assumes country 
specialization in either GM or non-GM commodities, while others assume countries can 
produce both and separate them in the supply chain. None of the models incorporate 
labeling and market segmentation costs, given the lack of good data at this point as to 
what those costs might be.
20 The models also differ in terms of the assumed productivity 
gains associated with adoption of GM technology￿again, there is as yet little 
quantitative information available.
21 The models also vary in how they specify shifts in 
consumer attitudes toward GM commodities, which reflects different views about how 
                                                 
20 The issue comes town to the cost of segmenting which are unknown. Empirical work needs to be done to 
estimate these costs. 
21 Marra, Pardey, and Alston (2002) make some effort to generalize from the individual studies at the farm-
level in the U.S.  
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these changes are going to play out in various countries. Finally, the models differ in how 
they capture the dissemination of the GM technology across countries, again reflecting 
different views about how the process might occur in the future.  
 
At this point, it is impossible to make critical judgments about the relative validity 
of the different models. They are essentially prospective views, based on some empirical 
evidence (largely from partial studies) and educated speculation about how these trends 
might evolve in the future. As better information becomes available, the models will 
evolve to incorporate it. 
 
There are a few robust results from the various studies: 
•  In general, adopters of the more productive GM technologies gain, while non-
adopters or GM-critical regions either do not gain at all or only gain some 
(through changes in world prices), depending on how strongly they segment their 
markets. In particular, developing countries will benefit if they can adopt the new 
technologies, and get mixed results if they are non-adopters. 
•  Assuming that the costs of labeling and market segmentation are not large, world 
markets can adjust relatively easily to the introduction of the new technologies. 
The price changes and changes in production and trade flows, while significant, 
are not dramatic. 
•  Developing countries are more sensitive to the issue, given their higher shares of 
agriculture in national product and of food in household consumption. Large 
developing countries, like India and China, gain from the new technology and are 
not much affected by changes in trade regime, since their domestic markets are 
large. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, are very dependent on 
EU markets and would potentially be strongly affected by EU trade restrictions, 
although they do not currently export significant amounts of potential GM 
commodities (e.g., maize and soybeans).  
 
In terms of future research, there are a number of knowledge gaps that require 
detailed study. Issues that are particularly important to any analysis of the impacts of the 
new technologies on trade and on developing countries include:  
•  What are the potential benefits of the next generation of GM goods, which might 
incorporate improved nutritional content (e.g., golden rice) or adaptability to 
particular climate conditions (e.g., drought tolerance)? This is especially 
important for developing countries.  
•  What are the productivity and cost gains from available and potential GM 
technologies? The historical record is short and the existing partial studies, which 
have been used to provide parameters for world trade models, are already out of 
date. 
•  What are the likely outcomes of the policy debates regarding labeling 
requirements and market segmentation?  
•  What are the actual and potential costs associated with labeling requirements, 
identify preservation, and segmentation of domestic and world markets for GM  
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and non-GM products? Knowledge of these costs is crucial to analyzing the 
potential spread of GM technologies.  
•  What are the implications of different intellectual property right (IPR) regimes for 
the dissemination of the new technologies and for the distribution of the benefits? 
Again, this is a crucial issue for analyzing potential spread of GM technologies.  
•  What will be the nature of consumer attitudes about commodities that incorporate 
gm technologies? What will be the impact on market demand? Results from the 
existing world trade models indicate the importance of this knowledge gap.  
•  What will be the impact of these new technologies on market structure and degree 
of international competition? Will the new market structure follow the pattern of 
the pharmaceutical industry, with an oligopolistic structure requiring a period of 
protected monopoly markets in order to recoup on large, up-front research costs? 
•  How will the institutions of the world trading system, including the WTO, adapt 
to the evolution of these new technologies?  
•  Given these trends, is there a need for various new forms of ￿special and 
differential treatment￿ for developing countries in the world trading system?  
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Appendix:  Summary of Computable General Equilibrium Models 
 
Article  Model Framework and Key 
Assumptions 
Scenarios Key  findings 
Anderson and Yao 
(2001) 
•  GTAP model (base 1995) 
projected to 2005 with no 
agricultural biotechnology 
adoption  (because GM 
technology is still at the early and 
experimental stage and will take 
years until it is adopted 
commercially on a large scale). 
•  Segment market by country (each 
country produces only GM or 
non-GM variety). 
•  GM technology is represented as 
a Hicks-neutral technology shift; 
an increase in total factor 
productivity of 5% for rice, 
cotton, maize, and soybean. 
•  Selected countries (North America, the 
Southern Cone of South America, and 
South East Asia) first without and then 
with China adopt GM technology in 
rice. 
•  Selected countries first without and 
then with China adopt GM technology 
in cotton. 
•  Selected countries first without and 
then with China adopt GM technology 
in maize and soybeans. 
•  Ban on imports of Chinese food 
products 
•  When other countries adopt GM rice, output growth depresses the price of 
rice in their own countries by up to 5% and in all other regions to a small 
extent.  When China is included, its output growth reduces the price of 
rice in China, but China is not sufficiently large to have an effect on world 
market prices. 
•  China is a net importer of cotton and a net exporter of textiles and apparel.  
When other countries adopt GM cotton, their output growth depresses 
prices in their own countries 5-6 % and other countries to a small extent.  
When China also adopts GM cotton, it dampens the global price of cotton.  
There is also a large increase in China￿s production of textiles and cotton.  
When the U.S. and EU also remove VERs on China￿s exports of textile 
and apparel, China￿s exports and production of these products increase 
and China becomes a net importer of cotton, despite the productivity 
increase in cotton production. 
•  When other countries adopt GM maize and soybeans, output increases and 
prices fall.  If China joins the GM-adopting group, its production and 
exports increase rather than fall; prices in China decline 5 %. 
•  If both the EU and Northeast Asia ban Chinese food products, China￿s 
gain from GM adoption would be reduced by 4/5. 
  




Article  Model Framework and Key 
Assumptions 
Scenarios Key  findings 
Huang et al. (2002)  •  GTAP model with baseline 
projection for 2001-2010 (the 
impact of alternative 
biotechnology scenarios is 
assessed relative to the baseline 
projection for 2010. 
•  Policy changes included in the 
baseline: China￿s WTo 
accession,; global phase out of the 
Multifiber Agreement;  EU 
enlargement with Central Europe. 
•  Update GTAP data for the 
Chinese economy to 2001. 
•  GM technology is represented by 
a factor biased productivity shock 
in the Chinese cotton and rice 
sectors.  
•  GM productivity gains in cotton. 
•  GM productivity gains in both cotton 
and rice. 
•  Import ban on GM rice by China￿s 
main trading partners (enlarged EU, 
Japan,Korea, and South East Asia). 
•  Labeling requirements for imported 
soybeans and domestic rice (modeled 
as an increase in the cost of services 
required for rice production, a 3 % 
increase in production costs through 
labeling). 
•  GM technology in Bt cotton reduces the supply price by 10.9%. This 
yields a 0.27% reduction in textile costs. Textile output and exports 
increase 0.7% and 0.9%, respectively. 
•  GM technology in rice reduces the supply price by 12%. 
•  The use of GM technology in both cotton and rice yields a welfare gain of 
5 billion US$ in 2010, about 3.5US$ per person. 
•  A trade ban on GM rice reduces China￿s exports substantially. However, 
although output growth in the rice sectors is somewhat dampened, the 
overall negative effect on China is small. The largest gains are realized 
within China. 
•  Labeling GM rice is costly in terms of welfare because it raises the cost of 
rice and hurts consumers.  
Van Meijl and van 
Tongeren (2001) 
•  GTAP model supplemented to 
include endogenous technology 
spillover. 
•  Segment market by country (each 
country produces only GM or 
non-GM variety). 
•  GM technology is differs by 
sector: 5% Hicks neutral 
productivity growth in maize, 5% 
chemical and labor augmenting 
technological change in soybeans. 
•  EU Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) insulates the price of grain 
in the EU from world price 
shocks. 
 
•  Base ￿ GM technology is adopted in 
North America 
•  Scenario 1 + endogenous international 
knowledge spillovers 
•  Scenario 2 + CAP implementation 
•  Scenario 3 +  social acceptability of 
GMO production technology (so EU 
does not benefit from productivity 
shock) 
•  Scenario 4 + EU ban on GMO imports  
•  Australia-New Zealand potentially receive full spillovers because their 
farm size and education levels exceed the threshold levels; Argentina and 
EU potentially receive about 60-70% of the productivity growth; potential 
spillover in developing countries is smaller. 
•  The CAP changes the EU￿s production response to GMOs (without taking 
social acceptance into account). Coarse grain output increases by 2.9% 
rather than decreases by ￿0.2%, indicating that the EU is isolated from the 
downward pressure on world prices brought about by the global 
productivity boost. 
•  When consumers in the EU find GMO technology socially unacceptable 
(scenario 4), production and farm income do not change because the CAP 
insulates farmers from productivity improvements in other regions. 
•  If the EU completely rejects consumption of products produced with 
GMO technology (import ban, scenario 5), production and farm income 
increase dramatically (oilseed output increases nearly 20%,  farm income 
from soybeans increases 24%)  
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Article  Model Framework and Key 
Assumptions 
Scenarios Key  findings 
Nielsen and 
Anderson (20001a) 
•  GTAP model 
•  Productivity growth from GM 
technology in maize and soybeans 
is modeled as a 5% total factor 
productivity gain. 
•  Segment market by country (each 
country produces only GM or 
non-GM variety) 
•  GM technology is adopted in coarse 
grains (excluding wheat and rice) and 
oilseeds in North America, Mexico, the 
Southern Cone of Latin America, India, 
China, Rest of East Asia (excluding 
Japan and the East Asian NICs), and 
South Africa.  Other countries are 
assumed to refrain from using GM 
crops in their production systems. 
•  GM technology is adopted and the EU 
bans imports of GM products. 
•  GM technology is adopted and there is 
a partial shift in EU preferences away 
from imported coarse grain and 
oilseeds and in favour of domestically 
produced crops. The scenario is 
implemented as an exogenous 25% 
reduction in final consumer and 
intermediate demand for all imported 
oilseeds and coarse grain (that is, not 
only those which can be identified as 
coming from GM-adopting regions) 
•  A 5% reduction in overall production costs in coarse grains and oilseeds 
increase coarse grain production between 0.4 and 2.1% and increases 
oilseed production between 1.1 and 4.6 % in the GM-adopting regions.   
World prices for coarse grains and oilseeds decline by 4.0 and 4.5% 
respectively. 
•  An EU ban on imports of GM coarse grain and oilseed (identified as such 
by country of origin), means North American oilseed production declines 
by 10 % and exports by almost 30%.   The changes in coarse grain are less 
dramatic because North America is not as dependent on exports to the EU.  
For Sub-Saharan Africa, which by assumption is unable to adopt the new 
GM technology, access to EU markets when other competitors are 
excluded expands.  Oilseed exports from this region rise enough to 
increase domestic production by 4%.  The EU experiences a decline in 
aggregate welfare of 43 billion U.S. dollars per year, rather than an 
increase of 2 billion, as it did in the first scenario. 
•  When EU consumers shift away from all imported oilseeds and coarse 
grains (that is not only those which can be identified as coming from GM-
adopting regions),  the results are much less dramatic as the case of the 
import ban from GM-adopting regions.  Output of oilseeds expand slightly 
in this scenario. In contrast to scenario 2, Sub-Saharan Africa loses export 
share to the GM-adopting regions and therefore its output declines.  




Article  Model Framework and Key 
Assumptions 




•  GAMS based model, using data 
from GTAP. 
•  All regions produce some of both 
the GM and non-GM varieties of 
each product; in North America, 
South America, and Low-income 
Asia, 40% of coarse grain and 
60% of oilseed  (90% for South 
America) production use GM 
technology. 
•  Producers who use GM potential 
agriculture as an intermediate 
good (e.g.  livestock, meat & 
dairy, vegetable oils & fats, and 
other processed food sectors) and 
direct consumers of GM potential 
crops have an endogenous 
decision over the GM and non-
GM variety; the choice between 
GM and non-GM is determined 
by a CES function. 
•  GM productivity shock is a 10% 
increase in primary factor 
productivity. 
•  The factor productivity shock in the 
GM sectors is performed against a 
variety of base models which differ in 
terms of the substitution elasticities for 
GM and non-GM products in the two 
most GM-critical. Initially, it is 
assumed that the elasticity of 
substitution between GM and non-GM 
varieties is high and equal in all 
regions.  Then, the elasticities of 
substitution between the GM and non-
GM varieties are seen as increasingly 
poorer substitutes in production and 
consumption.  Consumers in other 
regions are assumed to be indifferent so 
the two crops remain highly 
substitutable 
•  In all scenarios, output of GM varieties increases and output of non-GM 
varieties declines, due to the productivity shock in the GM varieties.   
•  The North America region is very sensitive to changes in preferences 
towards GMOs because it is the world￿s largest exporter of both oilseeds 
and coarse grains and it is particularly dependent on GM-critical markets 
for these products. Total exports of the GM varieties decline as GM and 
non-GM substitutability worsens in the GM-critical regions, and this is 
particularly so for oilseeds because almost 80% of North American 
oilseeds exports are initially sold in these markets. 
•  GM oilseed exports from South America (an extensive GM adopter) and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (a regions with a low share of GM varieties in total 
production) initially increase due to the factor productivity shock.  As 
preferences shift, total GM-oilseed exports decline and GM-exports are 
redirected from the GM-critical regions and are spread evenly over all 
other importing regions.  
•  Low-income Asia is a net importer of both oilseeds and cereal grains.  
Most of these imports come from North and South America. Total imports 
of GM crops into this region increases slightly as preferences turn against 
GMOs in the EU and High-income Asia. 
•    




Article  Model Framework and Key 
Assumptions 




•  GAMS based model, using data 
from GTAP. 
•  All regions produce some of both 
the GM and non-GM varieties of 
each product; in North America, 
South America, and Low-income 
Asia, 40% of coarse grain and 
60% of oilseed  (90% for South 
America) production use GM 
technology. 
•  GM productivity shock is a 10% 
increase in primary factor 
productivity and a 30% reduction 
in chemicals. 
•  Identity preservation in the 
processing sectors: non-GM 
varieties of processed foods use 
only non-GM farm products as 
the intermediate inputs. 
•  Consumer preference shock can 
either be a change in preferences 
or a structural shift for which no 
change in price can induce an 
increased consumption of GM 
foods. 
 
•  GM technology is introduced for 
oilseeds and cereal grains.  All 
consumers find GM and non-GM 
varieties to be good substitutes in 
consumption. 
•  GM technology and low elasticity of 
substitution between GM and non-GM 
varieties for consumers in the EU and 
High-income Asia. 
•  GM technology and a structural shift in 
preferences for consumers in the EU 
and High-income Asia.  The share of 
GM foods in consumption in the EU 
and High-income Asia is reduced to 
2%. 
•  In scenarios 1 and 2, production and exports of GM products increase; the 
gains are smaller when the EU and High-income Asia view GM and non-
GM varieties as bad substitutes (scenario 2). 
•  When consumers reject GM foods, total U.S. GM cereal grain and 
oilseeds exports fall by 17 % and 33% respectively.  Exports of the non-
GM varieties increase by 10% and 16% respectively.  Production of GM 
oilseeds in the U.S. declines by 15% in spite of the factor productivity 
gain and the reduced chemical input requirement.  This is because the U.S. 
is highly dependent on exports to a GM-critical region. 
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